Mobile QR Code QR CODE : The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
Title Suppression of Strategic Capacity Withholding by Capacity Payment in a Competitive Generation Market
Authors 이광호(Lee, Kwang-Ho)
Page pp.1199-1204
ISSN 1975-8359
Keywords Capacity Withholding ; Capacity Payment ; Cost Based Pool ; Cournot Model ; Nash Equilibrium
Abstract In a cost based pool market, the generation capacity can be used as strategic bids by generation companies (Gencos) with the cost functions open to the market. Competition using strategic capacities is modeled by Cournot and Perfect Competiton (PC) model, and transformed into two by two payoff matrix game with Gencos' decision variables of Cournot and PC model. The payoff matrices vary when capacity payments are given to Gencos in accordance with their capacity bids. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the matrices also moves with capacity price changes. In order to maximize social welfare of the market, NE should locate in a certain position of the payoff matrices, which corresponds to a PC NE. A concept of a critical capacity price is proposed and calculated in this paper that is defined as a minimum capacity price leading to PC NE. The critical capacity price is verified to work as a tool for suppressing a strategic capacity withholding in simulations of a test system.