The weaknesses of the different established technologies were analyzed in the previous
section. Many studies on the organization of security agreements on wireless communication
devices are being conducted and discussions before developing a standard in forming
the MIPv6 infrastructure.
The following are the recommendations for the establishment of a security system for
the standardized IETF protocols:
1) Build a fast and safe RO mode that depends on securing the exchange of BU messages.
2) Enhancement of security measures for wireless communications between the MN and
the HA and wired communications between the HA and the CN.
3) Develop a moderate resource allocation process for the MN driving and communication
infrastructure.
4) Build a higher level of security authority system on the existing RR technology.
5) Provide an authentication mechanism for multicast services and optimized unicast
services that will be introduced in the future.
This paper proposes a new security process method to improve QoS at the observant
level.
3.1 ISAS Security Module on AAA
The ISAS security system based on AAA infrastructure is a security module and an independent
security authentication mechanism. Fig. 3 presents the structure of the ISAS system model.
The ISAS structure includes a Pre-Authentication Agent (PAA), which is responsible
for the pre-authentication, and a Security Registration Client (SRC), which is provided
with the security authentication system. The SRC is provided with an additional module
at the end of the network, transfers binding to the CN instead of the MN, and activates
RO mode. Fig. 4 depicts the system organization of the ISAS system.
The configuration comprises the existing AAA infrastructure components and additional
security authentication modules on the Home and Visited domains. At the Visitor’s
domain, the PAA module performs limited authentication linked with AAAc and AAAv to
work actively in connection with buffer memory. The ISAS, an adjunctive module of
SRC or the HA in the Home domain, is included. The ISAS assists the SRC module in
receiving information from AAAh and transmitting BU messages to the CN via the HA,
which serves as the main server of the security authentication system. Through this
scenario, the PAA produced an authentication mechanism, and SRC activated the RO mode
between the MN and the CN without the aid of the wireless infrastructure of RR technology.
The advantages that can be brought by the system when developed into the security
authentication process can be the following:
1) Guarantee the high-level quality of security by working independently from the
wireless communication system and as it is based on the AAA infrastructure.
2) Provide a high-level quality of security for communications between the MN and
the HA through the use of AAA infrastructure, enforce the PAA security, and increase
the utilization of Multi Cast service and Router buffer memory.
3) Completes the authentication and registration on time and activates the RO mode
faster because BU and establishment of security agreement are made up simultaneously.
Fig. 3. Shape of the ISAS System Model.
Fig. 4. ISAS System Configuration Map.
3.3 ISAS Operating Algorithms
Fig. 6 shows the overall working environment of the proposed ISAS system.
(a) The MN produces NAI and IRR messages to activate RO mode with the CN and security
authentication for the HA through the AAA server. The messages allocate CoA as the
source address and PAA as a destination address. The IRR messages include a request
message for PAA and AAA registration and BU message to the CN. This is to perform
security authentication and RO activation simultaneously. The IRR message parameter
values include NAI for CoA and AAA registration, which will be used as the source
address for all messages, addressing for all stopovers, and the BU message for the
CN.
(b) The sent messages arrive automatically at AAAc through the PAA. The AAAc checks
the LC value and DAD from the authentication request message from the MN to produce
an ARR message.
(c) The ARR message also includes messages, such as authentication requests to upper
system layers and BU messages from the MN, which are sent to AAAc and AAAh.
(d) The AAAv server on the transmission process checks if the messages are transmitted
automatically from registered AAAc. After the additional message verification processes
based on the PAA system algorithm, the ARA (AA-Registration Answer) is produced and
sent to PAA.
(e) PAA investigates it and sends back a PRA (PAA-Registration Answer) message to
the MN to complete processing the lower authentication system. The detailed algorithm
for this process is explained in the next section.
(f) The ARR message sent through the former course passes through AAAh to check if
the message is from a registered AAAv.
(g) If there is no error, the HOR message is produced based on other information needed
for the authentication algorithm, calculates network authentication data, and sends
the message to the HA/ISAS.
(h) The message is transmitted and distributed from AAAh to the HA/ISAS and SRC module
to activate RO mode by organizing the upper authentication system. The SRC module,
which always works on the Key Allocation Process, performs under the relevant algorithm,
and maintains a certain value by reporting its Secret Key volume with KQR (Key Quantity
Report) message. If values are lacking in the KCN of the CN, it requests messages
to keep the amount of KCN of the CN. This process is explained in detail with the
algorithm in the next section.
(i) The SRC receives the BU message and encodes it with the KCN of the CN to renew
as the CN.
(j) On the process, if the CN confirms that the message has no errors, it sends a
BA message and packets to the MN, wherein the RO mode is activated.
(k) The HA/ISAS processes the Diameter message, which goes through the authentication
process with the AAAh message.
(l) When the received message is clear, it produces a BA message and transmits a HOA
message that includes the encapsulated BA message for the MN. the HA saves the Binding
Information in Binding Cache, and the key value is calculated to activate the security
agreement with the MN under the ISAS security module.
(m) The AAAh produces and transmits an ARA message, which passes through AAAv. The
AAAc changes the received AAA message into RA (Registration Answer), which meets the
applied communication infrastructure and interface standard of the MN before transmission
to the MN to complete the AAA authentication process.
(n) The BU message from SRC to the CN is confirmed, and the BA (Binding Acknowledge)
message to activate the MN and RO mode is sent to the MN. RO mode is then activated,
and the system can transmit packets directly to the MN. In some cases, problems, such
as the BA message between the MN and the CN, can arrive earlier than RA messages of
the HA/ISAS between the MN and AAA may occur. In this regard, The PAA module checks
the messages toward the MN and gives a standby order to the connected AR (Access Router)
to prevent distorted message scenarios. The registration information of the MN needs
to be confirmed first and test the possibility of attack if errors are found during
the verification process or if the information is not identified.
(o) When there is a request to stop receiving packets, the verification process containing
the error is repeated. Based on the result, it moves to the next process and notifies
the attack confirmation or warning message. Through these courses, the general system
is completed, and the way of working the module is reported in the next chapter.
Fig. 6. ISAS Process Diagrams.
3.3.1 Pre-Authentication Operating Algorithms
The PAA organizes a low certification system to connect the space between AAAc and
AAAv. The PAA method includes a certification by coding its secret key system, which
uses a created NVC (Node Verification Code) as an authentication code. The key components
of NVC are based on ARA information received from AAAv. It includes a mobile cookie
received from the MN, the registration information of the MN, and data associated
with the service request. Fig. 7 presents the primary components of NVC.
The AAA certification message received from AAAv guarantees that there were no problems
in the process of AAA certification, which the MN goes through, and it ensures integrity
by adding information received from the MN. The MN cannot decode the created NVC;
only the PAA can read the data through a secret key. The reason for having a composition
like this is not to expose a secret key of PAA to an attacker. Fig. 8 shows the process diagram of PAA.
(a) The PAA authentication process starts whenever an IRR message is received from
the MN.
(b) The IRR message is then checked to see if it includes an NVC.
(c) The presence of an NVC in the IRR message will trigger the verification step.
(d) The integrity of the NVC is demonstrated through the verification process that
checks whether the NVC is appropriately created. It also checks issues regarding packet
transmission order from the buffer memory of the Router and completes organizing the
lower authentication mechanism. As with all other security authentication systems,
weak points of security can be found during the first authentication process, and
the PAA has a process to supplement it. The MN does not have NVC information while
it accesses the wireless system and when it registers to the HA or the CN. Consequently,
the NVC would be included in transmitting an IRR message.
(e) The PAA has a waiting time for returning a reply after its registration to the
HA.
(f) It receives an ARA message replied after the AAA authentication AAA process and
determines if the verification process is completed by checking the ARA message.
(g) The PAA creates the NVC based on the ARA message and transmits it to the MN, which
uses the authentication value in the handover process.
(h) If the integrity of NVC is not verified or ARA message information is not correct,
the PAA sends a request message to stop packet transmission and reports an attack
alarm to the upper authentication layer. The secret key of PAA is not disclosed on
the network to provide a highly secured authentication. The renewal process of the
packet distribution tree may be delayed from a few to a dozen seconds on some existing
Multicast Routing protocols because the authentication process for a multicast service
is accomplished at the top level. A multicast service is unreliable, and decreasing
packet losses through fast handovers will be a key consideration.
With this technique, fast handovers with an authentication process on the lower network
level guarantee mobility and secure handovers.
Fig. 7. Major Components of the NVC Message.
Fig. 8. PAA Process Diagrams.
3.3.2 Security Registration Operating Algorithms
The SRC is a lower module in the HA/ISAS that includes security on BU messages and
activation of RO mode. The preconditions for this algorithm are identified as follows:
1. The MN must have a symmetry key(K$_{\mathrm{S-MN}}$) and notifies the HA with its
registration information.
2. The HoA message from AAAh must contain a BU message to register to the CN.
3. The SRC module shares symmetry keys with each CN as the service provider.
The SRC has K$_{\mathrm{S-CN}}$ with the CN, a service provider, and must retain the
security through IPsec in the wired communication section. The SRC processes the binding
with the CN includes the following steps: receives a coded KCN or nonce from the symmetry
key between SRC and the CN, keeps it in the SRC module, chooses one of the KCN randomly
among the keys it had when it receives BU message of MN from AAAh, encode it, and
sends the BU through the CN. This process is recommended, even if there is a security
agreement from IPsec, because double transmission of a secret key may cause the disclosure
of its key value, which is considered a security risk. In addition, the transmission
of BU messages to the CN with the symmetric key can be susceptible to adversary attacks,
which makes the symmetric key information available for decoding received messages.
Therefore, even if the adversary penetrates the security channel secured by IPsec,
analyzes the symmetric key of SRC and the CN, and obtains the secret key of the CN,
the MN has allocated secret key information randomly, so the adversary needs to analyze
all the transmitted packets to insert its aggression information. When the adversary
analysis may have been completed, the lifetime of the nonce values may already have
expired. Hence, the secret key becomes useless. Fig. 9 depicts the Process Diagram, which contains all the number of cases of SRC.
(a) First, the SRC requests a secret key value from the CN. The request message for
secret key value is sent coded with a mutual symmetric key, such as other messages,
to preclude the adversary from analyzing the request message and finding the key value
of the CN because it includes secret key request information for the CN address.
(b) The SRC receives and keeps the coded secret key with a symmetric key from the
CN.
(c) The number of secret keys of the CN that SRC keeps is checked, and it is determined
if the key values for later authentication are enough. If it is insufficient, return
to the first step requesting a key value from the CN. When the authentication for
the BU message increases or the secret key of the CN is in shortage due to the expiration
of the lifetime of the nonce of the CN, the process also needs to return to the first
step. The reason why SRC keeps the secret key of the CN is to be ready to encode and
transmit promptly when the BU message arrives. The amount of secret keys of the CN
that SRC needs to keep is decided on the average value, which depends on the BU receiving
the message on the network.
(d) Next, the AAAh sends only BU messages to SRC among the messages from the MN.
(e) The SRC then checks whether the secret key of the CN that the MN wants for a BU
message exists. The possible problem is that another MN is set as a CN.
(f) In that case, symmetric key information of the MN from the HA/ISAS is needed.
The SRC makes and sends a transmit request message for a secret key with the symmetric
key from the HA/ISAS.
(g) If there is a secret key value of the CN and if all the secret key of the CN is
exhausted, return to the first step.
(h) On the other hand, if there are enough secret keys of the CN, distribute them
randomly, encode the BU message, and send it to the CN.
The BU message and SRC module authentication in the proposed methodology will not
take a long time unless the identified issues on the steps will not arise. Although
some issues may arise at every step, a long delay would not happen. Theoretically,
in the proposed methodology, the MN can activate RO mode as soon as it receives the
AAA authentication message of the HA/ISAS because the process is expected to be performed
before the AAA authentication response message from the HA/ISAS to MN is transmitted
or at the same time.
Fig. 9. SRC Process Diagrams.