| Title |
A Study on the Jeju Renewable Energy Market Scheme and Dispatch Instruction Compliance Compensation |
| Authors |
윤승진(Seung-jin Yoon) ; 김대진(Dae-jin Kim) |
| DOI |
https://doi.org/10.5370/KIEE.2026.75.9.2017 |
| Keywords |
Day-ahead market; Dual settlement structure; Imbalance penalty; Mixed-integer linear programming; Real-time market; Renewable energy bidding scheme |
| Abstract |
As the penetration of renewable energy resources increases, output variability and short-term forecasting errors have become critical factors affecting power system operation and market settlement outcomes. In Korea, the Jeju renewable energy market pilot scheme has introduced a dual settlement framework that combines day-ahead and real-time market settlements. The imbalance penalty(IMBP) mechanism of the pilot scheme has recently been revised from a one-sided structure, which mainly penalized over-generation deviations, to a bilateral structure that also penalizes under-generation deviations under specific system and dispatch conditions. However, the quantitative effect of this transition on operating behavior and settlement revenues under different bidding conditions has not been sufficiently examined. In addition, although performance-related capacity factors have been introduced, the current settlement scheme still lacks an explicit settlement signal that directly rewards dispatch instruction compliance accuracy at each trading interval. This paper first formulates the revised bilateral IMBP mechanism and quantitatively evaluates its effect through a VPP-based mixed-integer linear programming simulation. It then proposes a dispatch instruction compliance compensation scheme that rewards resources according to their dispatch-following accuracy. The previous one-sided IMBP scheme, the revised bilateral IMBP scheme, and the revised scheme with the proposed compensation mechanism are compared under predefined over-bidding and honest-bidding scenarios. The results show that the revised bilateral IMBP partially reduces the settlement advantage under the predefined over-bidding scenario, but the reduction is limited because most of the advantage arises from the day-ahead and real-time price difference in the dual-settlement structure. The proposed compensation scheme provides an additional economic signal for accurate dispatch following and encourages ESS operation for improved compliance performance within the allowable deviation band. Since the bidding quantity is specified exogenously, these results should be interpreted as a comparison of settlement outcomes under predefined bidding scenarios rather than as an analysis of participant bidding choices. |