KimEunhwan1
KimJae-Joon2
-
(Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH),
77, Cheongam-ro, Nam-gu, Pohang-si, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Korea 37673)
-
(Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro,
Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea 08826)
Copyright © The Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers(IEIE)
Index Terms
Cryptography, frequency collapse, hardware security, ring oscillator (RO), true random number generator (TRNG)
I. INTRODUCTION
CMOS true random number generators (TRNGs) serve a key role as essential components
in security integrated circuits [1-14]. As Internet of Things (IoT) devices become more popular, it is expected that the
need for lightweight CMOS TRNG circuits will grow further in the future [15]. Additionally, high-quality random numbers (RNs) are indispensable for stochastic
computing, machine learning/deep learning, and Ising machines designed for combinatorial
optimization problems [16-18]. For applications that require high levels of security, TRNGs are favored over pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs), which generate bit sequences with fixed patterns based
on a given seed. The distinguishing feature between TRNGs and PRNGs is that TRNGs
generate RNs using an entropy source based on unpredictable physical noise. CMOS TRNGs
typically produce random bits leveraging device-level noise such as thermal or flicker
noise. TRNG types are categorized based on their use of noise amplification [7], metastability [8], and chaotic map [9] as entropy sources. There are also efforts to extend functionality by combining TRNG
with a physically unclonable function (PUF), a main feature in hardware security [10]. Further advancements include attempts to embed TRNG functionality into existing
memory [11].
One popular type is the ring oscillator (RO) based TRNG, which leverages timing jitter
[1-6]. The throughput of RO-based TRNGs (RO-TRNGs) is relatively low, but they are known
to consume lower power and occupy a small area. Hence, RO-TRNGs are repeatedly used
in power-constrained IoT and portable devices. However, for an RO to function as a
good entropy source, RO-TRNGs need to be tolerant to power injection noise, and the
trip voltage of the inverter is required to be well-defined [6]. Numerous efforts have aimed to resolve issues within conventional RO-TRNGs. In [2], three fundamental frequencies are initiated simultaneously in the RO and then are
reduced to a single signal. The time from initiation to collapse serves as the entropy
source for the TRNG. A characteristic of [2] is that as the number of RO stages increases, the TRNG robustness is enhanced because
the oscillating signal is less likely to be affected by signal-path mismatches. However,
this TRNG significantly increases power and area consumption by employing an additional
RO to detect the collapse point. Other collapsing RO-TRNGs have adopted methods to
modify the signal path to reduce signal-path mismatches [3,5]. E. Kim et al. [4] adopted a differential structure with feedback resistance to reduce the mismatch
in the RO cell and enhance immunity to power noise.
In this paper, we propose a different structure for the collapsing RO-TRNG. Previous
collapsing RO-TRNGs require additional circuits to detect the collapse cycle or face
the challenge of estimating the operating frequency based on measurements [2, 3, 5].
In Section II, we present the structure of the TRNG that reduces the two ROs of the
[2] structure to a single RO and explain its block diagram and operation. Section III
provides peripheral circuits for chip measurement and the corresponding results. We
conclude this paper in Section IV.
II. THE PROPOSED TRNG
1. Analysis of Collapsing RO-TRNG
We illustrate an RO of the TRNG implemented with fully digital logic (Fig. 1). The RO operates initially at a 3x frequency of steady-state RO because it generates
three edges row by row due to the reset pulse. The entropy source is created by accumulating
jitter during the time it takes for two of the three edges to intersect and subsequently
collapse, returning to the 1x frequency. The time difference T$_{D}$ between the two
edges is approximated by Barkhausen’s criteria, expressed as
where n represents the number of RO stages; t$_{p}$ is the average propagation delay
of a NAND gate. Thus, the accumulated jitter until the occurrence of two edge collapses
can be expressed as
where ${\Delta}$t$_{s}$ represents the skew of the two edge signals that occur as
they pass through each NAND gate. t$_{1,J}$ and t$_{2,J}$ represent the jitter for
the first and second edge signals, respectively, produced by each NAND gate due to
physical noise [3]. Hence, we can modulate by controlling the n of the T$_{D}$ to extend the average
collapse time, obtaining a more unpredictable source influenced by the accumulated
t$_{J}$ during the increased time. The change in n causes a proportional shift in
the granularity of each row of RO, resulting in a corresponding variation in ${\Delta}$t$_{s}$
[2]. The jitter t\-$_{J}$, which accumulated more physical noise, inherently exhibits
a more complex random walk. As T$_{D}$ increases and ${\Delta}$t$_{s}$ decreases,
it becomes an excellent entropy source with an inverse Gaussian distribution.
Fig. 1. The schematic of a ring-oscillator with 3-edge collapses [2], composed of 2-NAND gates.
2. Implementation of Proposed TRNG
We depict the block diagram of the proposed TRNG (Fig. 2) and explain its operation through a timing diagram (Fig. 3). In Fig. 1, the TRNG begins its operation as an entropy source initiated by a reset pulse driven
by an external clock. The RO that generates 3-edges sends its three outputs to a majority
voter. A typical majority voter, composed of four NAND gates, generates a signal (MV)
that maintains a constant 3x frequency regardless of the signal collapse (Fig. 3). Before the collapse, both MV and RO outputs (B[0:2]) operate at the 3x frequency
and in phase. However, after the collapse of the RO, although all B[0:2] outputs transition
to a 1x frequency, MV continues to maintain a 3x frequency because the phase differences
among the signals remain at 60$^{\circ}$. MV is divided by half frequency (1.5x) and
forwarded to a frequency detector, which compares with the RO output (B[2]). As the 3-edges collapse, the FD signal becomes 'H'. FD signal controls a switch
that determines whether the RO output is transmitted to a counter, which then accumulates
the number of cycles up to the collapse time. The counter outputs are sent to an XOR
+ shift register array synchronized with an external clock, enhancing entropy and
generating a random number [4]. In Fig 2, TRNG can operate in an asynchronous mode concerning the clock. In asynchronous
mode, the TRNG operates autonomously at its maximum or minimum speed, which facilitates
the determination of an optimal clock for measurement.
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed TRNG.
Fig. 3. Timing diagram of the proposed TRNG.
3. Comparison with Related RO-TRNGs
The proposed TRNG maintains the advantages of the more straightforward collapsing
RO-based structure seen in [2], which can be fabricated using fully digital logic, occupies a small area, and offers
immunity against external attacks. Compared to [2], our approach allows for the detection of the moment the 3-edge collapses without
a reference RO, thereby cutting both the area occupied by the reference RO and its
power consumption in half. Previous collapsing RO-based TRNGs [3,5] face challenges in detecting the point of collapse without oscillating signal, thereby
requiring the aid of an extra host processor or making multiple measurements to infer
the collapse moment. The phase-shifting method uses feedback resistors and differential
structures inherent in analog circuit design, adding to the complexity of the design
[4]. Conversely, our work provides the benefit of autonomously detecting the collapse
time with a fully digital single RO.
III. TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND RESULTS
RO-TRNGs are vulnerable to the issue of producing fixed or specific patterned values
under strong power injection attacks of specific frequencies from external sources
[6]. We established peripheral circuits to test the TRNG against power injection attacks
(Fig. 4). We implemented two separate circuits for low and high- frequency injections to
test a broad range of frequencies. For low-frequency injections into the TRNG, we
utilized a function generator, and to measure the amount of power being injected,
a unity gain buffer was set up as a monitoring circuit. When the injected frequency
exceeds several hundred megahertz, accurately injecting a specific magnitude becomes
difficult. Such high frequencies are internally generated by a PLL, regulated in magnitude
by a high-voltage driver, and then injected into the TRNG. The unity gain buffer tracks
the common voltage, and the hysteresis comparator activates when the magnitude of
the attack injected into the TRNG exceeds the TH/TL thresholds and outputs a frequency
that is a quarter of the injected frequency.
We fabricated a prototype chip in 65 nm technology and showed the random bit sequence
measured with an oscilloscope at 1.2 V (Fig. 5). The single RO is constructed from NAND gates arranged in 3x5 stages and occupies
an area of 285 ${\mu}$m$^{2}$. Including the peripheral circuits, the total area is
702 ${\mu}$m$^{2}$. The PLL and the driver for the power attack are positioned around
the TRNG core in the layout.
Fig. 6 illustrates the change in the random bit sequence of the TRNG when a power attack
is injected. Two-bit streams (LSB and 5th LSB) are represented using 'black/white'
to indicate the '0/1' states. Fig. 6 top shows the 1 Mbits without a power attack, while the bottom displays the bit stream
during the low-frequency injection of a strong power attack with 0.6 V$_{\mathrm{PP}}$.
In both cases, the LSB retains good random bits. However, the upper bits exhibit a
specific pattern and lose their randomness depending on the injected frequency. We
utilized the NIST randomness test to precisely evaluate the randomness of each bit
stream [19]. The results from testing 1Mbits generated 100 times are presented in Table 1. Without a power attack, two-bit streams up to the 2nd LSB passed the NIST results,
but during a power attack at the oscillating frequency of RO with 0.3 V$_{\mathrm{PP}}$,
only the LSB passed.
We have summarized and compared previous TRNGs and their key features with our design
(Table 2). Table 2 shows that our design has a smaller area and higher throughput than previous RO-TRNG
styles.
Fig. 4. Power injection attack and monitoring circuit.
Fig. 5. Layout and measured bit stream.
Fig. 6. Bit sequences under power attack: LSB vs. upper bit.
Table 1. NIST randomness test
Table 2. Comparison with previous works
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a collapsing RO-based TRNG composed of 15 stages using
65 nm technology, and our contributions are as follows: (i) This work is implemented
entirely with digital logic and senses the 3-edge collapse moment without requiring
the reference RO. (ii) Entropy source composed of a single RO has improved energy
and area efficiency. (iii) We proposed a configuration of peripheral circuits for
testing against externally injected power attacks, confirming the robustness of the
TRNG. Evaluation results from the NIST randomness test showed that the proposed TRNG
exhibited sufficient randomness performance up to the 2nd LSB. This work offers high
efficiency, compactness, and excellent production capabilities, making it suitable
for portable applications.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The chip fabrication and EDA tool were supported by the IC Design Education Center(IDEC),
Korea.
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Eunhwan Kim received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in electrical engi-neering from
Kookmin University, Seoul, South Korea, in 2010 and 2012, respectively. He is currently
pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH),
Pohang, South Korea. From 2012 to 2014, he worked on the design of the display driver
interface at DB Hitek, Seoul. From 2014 to 2018, he was a Research Associate with
the i-Lab, POSTECH, working on hardware security. His current research interests include
computing-in-memory and hardware security circuit.
Jae-Joon Kim received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in electronics engi-neering from
Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea, in 1994 and 1998, respectively, and
the Ph.D. degree from the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University,
West Lafayette, IN, USA, in 2004. He is currently a Professor with Seoul National
University. From 2004 to 2013, he was a Research Staff Member with IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA. He was a Professor with the Pohang University
of Science and Technology, Pohang, South Korea, from 2013 to 2021. His current research
interests include the design of deep learning hardware accelerator, neuromorphic processor,
hardware security circuit, and circuit for exploratory devices.