LimChang Young1
KimYeon Seok1
KwonMin-Woo1*
-
(Department of Electric Engineering, Gangneung-Wonju National University, Gangneung,
Gangwon-do 25457, Korea)
Copyright © The Institute of Electronics and Information Engineers(IEIE)
Index Terms
Dynamic random access memory, disturbance, 1-row hammer, D0 failure, interfacial trap
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is used as the main memory in computing systems
due to its fast access speed and cost-effectiveness in terms of capacity. The growth
of large-scale data processing, such as cloud computing and big data, has led to an
increasing demand for high-capacity memory. Consequently, DRAM is striving to scale
down in order to achieve higher capacities. However, during this process, DRAM faces
critical issues. As it scales down, the distance among cells narrows, and this reduced
distance leads to electrical disturbance phenomena among adjacent cells. For example,
the Pass Gate Effect (PGE) is a disturbance phenomenon similar to threshold voltage
roll-off. When the gate is turned on, the energy barrier becomes lower in adjacent
cells. And rapid switching of a certain word-line on and off can cause bit-flips in
the data stored in adjacent cells, which is called 1-row hammer (1-RH) [1-4]. These disturbance phenomena can lead to abnormal operation and security vulnerabilities
in DRAM. Therefore, the most significant issue in current DRAM technology is 1-RH
[5-7].
1-RH is a problem that must be addressed because, unlike conventional software security
vulnerabilities, it is a method of exploiting hardware design defects, causing critical
problems for the security of any computer system, regardless of operating system (OS).
This makes 1-RH a critical security vulnerability not only for PCs, but for a wide
range of applications that use DRAM, including autonomous driving, data centers, AI,
etc.
1-RH is a phenomenon in which data stored in neighboring cells is bit-flipped to 0${\rightarrow}$1
or 1${\rightarrow}$0 when a specific word line is quickly turned on/off in a short
time, and the word line being turned on/off is called the aggressor, and the neighboring
cells being attacked are called victim cells. 1-RH has two types of failures: D0 failure,
where data changes from 0 to 1, and D1 failure, where data changes from 1 to 0. The
type of 1-RH is determined by the location of the aggressor and victim cells. Fig. 1 shows DRAM cell array and where D0 and D1 occur. In DRAM, to achieve high density,
two transistors share a single bit-line contact (BLC), resulting in each cell having
two positional relationships with adjacent cells. Fig. 2 shows cross-section views of A and B. In Fig. 2, where D0 failure occurred, the aggressor is the field passing gate (FPG) through
the gate next to the victim cell. where D1 failure occurred, the aggressor is the
gate of another transistor which share BLC.
In this study, to find a fundamental solution to mitigate D0 failure, we initially
analyzed the process of D0 failure and subsequently conducted a simulation based on
interfacial traps and device structure. We implemented the BCAT structure device using
TCAD 2D simulations and reproduced the 1-RH attack using mixed mode.
Fig. 1. DRAM cell array and location and type of victim cell according to aggressor.
Fig. 2. 2D cross-sectional view of DRAM cell and energy band diagram of cut line.
II. D0 FAILURE
D0 failure is a type of 1-RH, as the stored data changes from 0 to 1 through repeated
toggling of the aggressor. In other words, it signifies the phenomenon as electrons
stored in the capacitor are lost due to unintended electrical interactions with the
aggressor. D0 failure can be categorized into two primary steps: capture and diffusion
1. Electron Capture Process
D0 failure occurs when the aggressor is an FPG, as illustrated in Fig. 3, enabling direct electrical influence on the victim cell. Initially, when the aggressor
is activated, electrons stored in the victim cell's capacitor move towards the nearby
FPG oxide layer, with some electrons being captured within the interfacial traps.
Subsequently, when the aggressor is deactivated, most of the electrons drawn near
the FPG return to the victim cell's capacitor. However, the electrons captured by
the interfacial traps remain trapped and do not return to the victim cell's capacitor.
In other words, it is a capture process in which electrons cannot return to the capacitor.
Fig. 3. The two-step process of a D0 failure.
2. Diffusion Process
Electrons still remain due to traps when the aggressor is deactivated. Captured electrons
are gradually released from traps and randomly diffuse. During this process, some
electrons don't make it back to the original cell capacitor. Instead, they cross the
shallow energy barrier and are lost to the drain, as shown in Fig. 3. This is a diffusion process in which the captured electrons diffuse into the drain
instead of the capacitor.
If these two steps are rapidly repeated between refresh times, the capacitor voltage
rises due to the lost electrons, which cannot be ignored. finally, this leads to a
data change from 0 to 1.
In the first step, the number of captured electrons determines the number of electrons
lost in D0 failure, and the captured electrons are primarily influenced by interfacial
traps, which are the main agents of capture. In second step, factors related to the
physical distance from the capacitor, such as the structure of device and the location
of the trap. Therefore, we studied the variation of 1-RH with trap and device structure,
which are the main parameters of D0 failure.
III. RELATED RESEARCH
1. Error Correction Code (ECC)
ECC was originally designed to handle infrequent occurrences of data corruption caused
by cosmic rays or electrical interference, and it's also considered as one of the
effective defenses against 1-RH attacks. The primary purpose of ECC is to detect and
correct bit errors that occur within the memory system. To achieve this, ECC adds
parity bits to each data word to detect errors. ECC is efficient in addressing single-bit
errors and benefits from the difficulty of reverse engineering, enhancing data integrity
[8,9].
However, ECC is not well suited to defend against 1-RH, which attacks multiple cells
in a row by repeatedly accessing a specific row of memory. Additionally, ECC implementation
demands extra hardware and computations, potentially leading to increased costs and
performance degradation.
2. Static Counter Assignment (SCA)
SCA assigns a counter to each row to track the number of row activations, detect accessed
or attacker rows, and then refresh neighboring or victimized rows [9,10]. However, placing a separate counter for each row imposes significant area and power
overhead on the memory system and is not suitable for highly integrated DRAM.
3. Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation (PARA)
PARA, an alternative to 1-RH, involves accessing one or more adjacent rows with a
low probability whenever a particular row is accessed (i.e., refreshed). PARA offers
the advantage of being cost-effective as it doesn't require expensive hardware data
structures, and it activates adjacent rows infrequently, resulting in minimal performance
degradation and power consumption [9,11,12]. However, due to its probabilistic approach, PARA cannot entirely prevent 1-RH attacks,
and the need to access adjacent rows additionally can lead to performance overhead.
The current approaches are not fundamental solutions to directly mitigate 1-RH, but
rather a way to react to the problem when it occurs, and even then they are not well
suited to 1-RH, which attacks on a row-by-row basis rather than a single bit. They
also requires additional calculations or components that have the potential to degrade
system performance and increase power consumption [13]. Therefore, research on semiconductor properties and device physics is needed to
find a fundamental solution to 1-RH.
Fig. 4. 2-D view of BCAT structure.
IV. SIMULATION CONDITION
We conducted the study in 2D simulation and used SILVACO TCAD simulation. The device
used in the simulation has a BCAT structure similar to the 2Y technology node. depth
of victim cell word-line (WL$_{\mathrm{v}}$) is 150~nm and Depth of aggressor word-line
(WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$) is 165~nm. The gate oxide thickness is 8 nm on the sides and 5
nm on the bottom. Active width (W$_{\mathrm{active}}$) is 24 nm, storage node (SN)
capacitor is 10 fF and SN voltage is initially set 0V. In simulation, we have incorporated
the following models: 1) doping dependent Shockley-Read-Hall recombination (SRH);
2) band-to-band tunneling (BTBT); 3) and continuously variable transmission (CVT);
4) Fowler-Nordheim tunneling and direct tunneling (FNORD); 5) Hot Electron Injection
(HEI)
To implement the 1-RH in the simulation, we used a pulse of 100 ns on/off time and
10 ns rise/fall time in MixedMode. During the 1-RH, 0.5 V was applied to the drain,
-0.3 V to the WL$_{\mathrm{v}}$, and 0 V to the substrate. To check the effect of
the 1-RH on the properties of the trap and the structural changes of the device, we
measured the average voltage change of the capacitor per pulse.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations were used to examine the effects of the traps by varying the density,
temperature, location, capture cross section, and energy level of the traps, and the
effects of the device structure by varying the active width and fin depth.
First, the simulation results for the trap characteristics are shown in Fig. 5-7. The simulation results show that the higher the density of the trap, the higher
the temperature, and the higher the energy level (i.e., the deeper the trap), the
greater the average ${\Delta}$V/pulse, as shown in Fig. 5 and 6. The capture cross section shown in Fig. 6(b), which represents the capture probability of the trap also showed a trend of increasing
${\Delta}$V/pulse with increasing values. When we compared the amount of change in
the resulting values, we found that they were significantly affected by density and
temperature. These results confirmed that the trap is the main factor affecting the
first stage of the 1-RH, the capture process.
Next, we investigated the effect of the trap location, as shown in Fig. 7. By dividing the trap area into different sections, we found that the ${\Delta}$V/pulse
continues to increase as the trap gets deeper and then decreases as it leaves the
gate region. From these results, we could infer that the closer the trap is to the
bottom of the gate, the more effectively it moves the captured electrons out of the
capacitor, reducing the probability of the electrons returning to the capacitor during
the diffusion process.
Finally, we analyzed at the simulation results of the device structure. In Fig. 8(a), we can see that the larger the fin depth, the greater the effect, and in Fig. 8(b), we can see that the smaller the active width, the greater the effect. For the pin
depth, similar to the trap region, a larger depth tends to decrease the probability
of electrons returning to the capacitor in the diffusion process, while a larger active
width increases the SN node area, which increases the probability of electrons returning
to the capacitor.
The simulations show the effects of device structure and traps on the capture and
diffusion processes of D0 failure. In summary, traps affect the trapping process and
device structure affects the diffusion process. This suggests that there are three
ways to reduce the D0 failure: first, to reduce the number of trapped electrons by
improving the oxide film; second, to increase the probability of electrons returning
to the capacitor by changing the structure of the device; and finally, to prevent
the movement of electrons by WLa.
Fig. 5. The simulation result of D0 failure according to trap parameter: (a) result of trap density; (b) result of temperature.
Fig. 6. The simulation result of D0 failure according to trap parameter: (a) result of trap energy band; (b) result of capture cross section.
Fig. 7. The simulation result of D0 failure. According to interfacial trap region.
Fig. 8. The simulation result of D0 failure according to device structure: (a) results of fin depth; (b) results of active width.
VI. NITRIDE LAYER STRUCTURE
We propose a structure with a nitride layer added to the FPG oxide film, which does
not affect the cell size, as a way to mitigate D0 failure, as shown in Fig. 9(a). Silicon nitride has enough traps in the material that it is being used as a charge
trap layer to store electrons in flash memory [14]. If enough electrons are stored in the nitride layer by applying a programming voltage
to the proposed structure, the negative charge of the electrons stored in the nitride
layer prevents the movement of the electrons stored in the capacitor due to WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$
when the capacitor is switched on. In other words, reducing the electrical interference
caused by the WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$. Nitride layer raises the energy band near the WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$,
preventing the WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$ from attracting electrons stored in the victim cell.
The effect of the nitride layer depends on the programming voltage and depth. As the
depth of the nitride layer becomes shallower and closer to the SN doping region, or
as the programming voltage is increased, gate induced drain leakage (GIDL) occurs
in the victim cell. Therefore, a sufficient gap is required between the drain region
and the nitride layer, and an optimization process for the programming voltage is
required. Fig. 9(b) shows the effect of the programming voltage. We have experimented the ${\Delta}$V/pulse
as the programming voltage with a programming time of 100 ns. Up to the programming
voltage of 14V, the ${\Delta}$V/pulse decreased, but at the voltage after 14V, the
${\Delta}$V/pulse becomes negative because the nitride layer generates GIDL, which
supplies electrons to the capacitor. The proposed structure programmed at 14 V showed
about 70% improvement over the ordinary structure, as shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 9. Structure of proposed nitride layer BCAT and ∆V according to programming voltage.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate how 1-RH occurs and how it is affected by the structure
of the trap and device. 1-RH occurs by a two-step process consisting of electron capture
and diffusion. The capture step determines the number of electrons lost in the D0
failure phenomenon and is directly affected by the trap that captures the electrons.
The diffusion phase, in which the captured electrons are lost without returning to
the capacitor, is affected by the structure of the device, which determines the distance
between the captured electrons and the capacitor. In the proposed structure, a nitride
layer is added to mitigate 1-RH. The nitride layer prevents electrons from being trapped,
mitigating electrical interference when the WL$_{\mathrm{a}}$ is turned on. However,
depending on the length and position of the nitride layer and the programming voltage,
it can cause GIDL and supply electrons to the capacitor, causing additional power
consumption and data corruption, so an optimization process is required. The nitride
layer structure programmed with the optimized voltage showed an improvement of 70%
compared to the existing ordinary structure. Further oxide layer improvement studies
and the introduction of spherical oxide structures will improve the 1-RH even more
effectively.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by the National R&D Program through the National Research
Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT (NRF-2022M3I7A1078936)
and This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant
funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (2021R1G1A1093786).
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Chang Young Lim has been studying in the Department of Electronic Engineering
at Gangneung-Wonju National University (GWNU, Korea) from 2018 to 2023, His current
research interests include MOS devices for DRAM memory at the Intelligent Semiconductor
Device & Circuit Design Laboratory (ISDL) according to Professor Min-Woo Kwon.
Yeon Seok Kim has been studying in the Department of Electronic Engi-neering at
Gangneung-Wonju National University (GWNU, Korea) from 2019 to 2023, also he has now
been working on M.S. course at GWNU. His current research interests include MOS devices
for DRAM memory at the Intelligent Semiconductor Device & Circuit Design Laboratory
(ISDL) according to Professor Min-Woo Kwon.
Min-Woo Kwon received B.S. and Ph. D. degrees in department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering from Seoul National University (SNU) in 2012 and 2019, respectively.
From 2019 to 2021, he worked at the Samsung semicon-ductor Laboratories, where he
contributed to the development of 1x nm DRAM cell transistor and its characterization.
In 2021, he joined Gangneung-Wonju National University (GWNU) as an assistant professor
in the Department of Electric Engineering, where he is currently a professor. His
current research interests include the design and fabrication of neuromorphic device
(memristor synaptic device, Neuron circuit), steep switching device (FBFET), DRAM
cell transistors and 2- dimensional nanomaterials.